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Defining a catch-up index that measures rich-poor country income convergence and 
comparing it to within group convergence (β-convergence), defining relative convergence as 
decrease in rich-poor country income ratio and absolute convergence as decrease in rich-poor 
country income gap, we derive an equation for years for income equality to the frontier (full 
convergence).  Focusing on relatively homogeneous countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia, we show neither region has achieved either within group convergence or significant 
catching-up since 1951, and 21 of the 28 countries exhibiting catching-up in the most recent 21- 
years period, using US as the frontier, show falling behind over the longer period.  We show years 
for full convergence depend also on the initial conditions; the neo-classical hypothesis that poorer 
countries grow faster means relative convergence, relative convergence is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for absolute convergence; “Iron law of convergence” does not hold; and 
within group convergence is consistent with poorer countries in the group diverging absolutely 
while richer countries converge.   
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Income Convergence and the Catch-up Index  
1. Introduction 
This paper is concerned with measurement of inter-country income inequality and 
comparative development.  Sala-i-Martin (1990, 1996) introduces the term β-convergence for 
empirical tests of the neo-classical hypothesis that poorer economies tend to grow faster.1  The 
word “convergence” has simultaneously been given the following two meanings by neo-classical 
theory: a) tendency for the poorer economies to grow faster, and b) eventual equality of all 
countries’ per capita incomes.  See, Galor (1996).  This hypothesis is tested by cross-section 
regressions of growth rates of a group of countries on initial per capita income where β is the 
regression coefficient.  If the regression coefficient is significant and negative, it indicates, on 
average, the poorer countries in the group are growing faster.  Both unconditional and conditional 
convergence are defined.  The latter depends on similarity of the countries’ structural 
characteristics; when they are similar, one need not distinguish between unconditional and 
conditional convergence. 
A seemingly alternative approach to comparative incomes is to examine income ratios over 
time.  The income ratio may either be of the richest to the poorest country, or of a group of rich 
countries to that of all other countries, or of a select group of rich countries to a select group of 
poor countries; etc.  This literature takes “convergence” to mean reduction of income ratios, is a-
theoretical, and has no hypothesis of eventual equality of countries’ per capita incomes.   See,  
                                                 
 1In what follows, we do not use the term β-convergence for the neo-classical hypothesis 




Pritchett (1997), Jones (1997), and Cuberes and Jerzmanowski (2009). 
Barro (2015) finds unconditional β-divergence at the 0.24% rate for his Case 1, viz. 151 
countries from 1960-65 to 2005-10, conditional convergence for a sample of 89 countries for the 
1970-75 to 2005-10 period – conditional on variables to be discussed below, and defines what he 
names to be “iron law of convergence,” discussed below.  Ho (2006) finds β-convergence for 121 
countries at 1.28% annual rate. Lim and Mcleer (2004) interpret β-convergence to mean in a time 
series context that diﬀerences in per capita incomes among a cross section of economies are 
transitory.  Using this frame-work, they do not find income convergence between pairs of ASEAN-
5 countries for 1960-92.  Peron and Rey (2012) also use time series analysis and examine 
convergence of Indian Ocean Zone (IOZ) countries’ incomes to the IOZ average, and catch-up to 
the world mean income.  They find neither such convergence nor catching-up for the 1950-2008 
period.  Pritchett (1997) considers the 1870 to 1990 period for which no historical data for most 
developing countries exists.  By placing a lower bound on what the 1870 income would have been, 
and extrapolating backwards from the 1990 levels, he concludes developing countries’ fell behind 
rich countries’ Big Time between 1870 to 1990 both proportionately and absolutely.   
For 17 presently high-income countries, Maddison (1995) has collected nearly complete 
historical national income accounts data since 1870 that are comparable across countries.  Pritchett 
(1997) bemoans lack of similar reliable historical data for developing countries.  Nevertheless, we 
now have reliable data for most developing countries since 1950 in PWT.  This paper uses 
countries in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa to examine income convergence with this data.  
Most of these countries became independent after 1946 - only three existed as independent 
countries before 1947 (Nepal, Liberia, and Bhutan since 1768, 1847, and 1907, respectively, per 
the CIA’s The World Fact Book); the structural factors emphasized in the conditional convergence 
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literature are likely to be relatively homogeneous within each of these two regions; and most of 
these countries, being in the lower-end in the 1950s, had greater “advantage of backwardness” in 
the sense of either higher marginal product of capital (as in the neoclassical theory) or of 
technological imitation (as in endogenous growth model) for narrowing the income gap.  
We empirically examine comparative incomes overtime with a different orientation.  
Rather than examine whether poorer countries tend to grow faster in general, we use a bench-mark 
country (the frontier) and examine the extent to which countries are succeeding in their effort to 
catch-up to the frontier.  One can compare the catch-up rates of different countries to infer within 
group convergence.  At the same time, as we show below, the catch-up analysis directly examines 
poor-rich country income convergence that within group convergence does not. 
We do not examine absolute or relative personal poverty or inter-personal distribution of 
income; but examine relative poverty of a country, i.e., its distance from the frontier, instead.  
Empirically, personal income depends greatly on social and economic infra-structure, and the 
policies of a country where individuals live.  For example, Milanovic (2015) demonstrates that 
where individuals live, rather than individual effort or luck, is behind a greater part of world 
income differences; and Sala-i-Martin (2006) shows that about two-thirds of individual income 
inequality in the world is due to cross-country income differences.  This paper’s focus is on inter-
country income inequality rather than income inequality within a country.   
Section 2 below defines a catch-up index and relative and absolute convergence.  Section 
3 examines the relationship between relative and absolute convergence, and derives an equation 
for number of years for income equality to the frontier.  It compares the catch-up index to income 
ratios and within group convergence (β-convergence) and shows the neo-classical hypothesis 
(poorer countries grow faster) measures relative convergence, not absolute.  Section 4 computes 
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the catch-up index using PWT 9.0 for countries in the sample from 1951 or later (if their PWT 
data availability year is after 1951) to 2013.  It uses 1971 and 1992 as alternative base years and 
examines catching-up of the two regions and within-region convergence.  Section 5 concludes. 
2. Catch-up Index, and Relative and Absolute Convergence  
The catch-up index and relative and absolute convergence are defined as follows.  Let yJ0 
and yBM0 represent Country J’s per-capita RGDP (defined below) for the base year and the bench-
mark country’s per-capita RGDP for Country J’s base year, respectively, and RJ0 Country J’s base 
per capita RGDP ratio.  Then, 
RJ0 = (yJ0/ yBM0)        (1) 
For each subsequent year, similar ratios of a country’s annual per-capita RGDP to that of 
the bench-mark country are computed.  Thus, for year t,  
RJt = (yJt/ yBMt)        (1́) 
We assume the bench-mark country is the richer country for all t.  Then,  
RJt = (yJt/ yBMt) < 1, for all t.       (2)
2 
Country J’s catch-up index for year t is the ratio of its per capita RGDP ratio for year t  
to its base per capita RGDP ratio.  Let IJt represent this index.  Then,  
IJt = (RJt/ RJ0)          (3) 
If the value of the catch-up index is greater than 100, or it increases, it indicates catching- 
                                                 
2Generally, US is taken as the bench-mark or frontier country.  This is not necessary.  The 
bench-mark or frontier can be any rich country, and one can also use total RGDP and total 
population of group of rich countries and call these totals as belonging to one country named, 
say, Frontier; as long as the bench-mark or frontier country satisfies (2).   
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up, i.e., an increase in Country J’s (poorer country’s) income ratio to the frontier’s.  If it is less, 
or it decreases, it indicates falling behind or a decrease in Country J’s income ratio to the 
frontier’s.  When a poorer country’s income ratio increases/decreases, we call it relative 
convergence/divergence.  Of the two terms, catching-up/falling behind or relative 
convergence/relative divergence, we prefer catching-up.  Its focus is on income inequality and it 
fits in with neo-classical and endogenous growth models’ “advantage of backwardness.”   
In contrast to relative convergence/divergence, absolute convergence/divergence is a 
reduction/increase in richer-poorer country income-levels gap.  As far as I can make out, the phrase 
relative convergence/divergence has not been used in the context of income levels.  Absolute 
divergence has been used with the same meaning as here – an increase in rich-poor country income 
gap.  On the other hand, absolute convergence has been used to mean convergence to the same 
income level unconditional on structural characteristics.  We call it (absolute unconditional) full 
convergence; and discuss this literature below. 
Let yJt and yKt and yJt+1 and yKt+1 represent the per capita income levels, of countries J and 
K, ρKt and ρKt+1 the ratios of Country K’s per-capita income to that of Country J, and ΔKt and ΔKt+1 
the difference between Country K’s and Country J’s, per-capita incomes for year t and (t + 1).  
Assume Country K’s per-capita income in period t is higher than Country J’s.3  Then, the income- 
difference, ΔKt, is positive, and income ratio, ρKt, is greater than one.  Let the (initial) income ratio 
be h.  In symbols, 
ρKt = (yKt/ yJt) = h > 1 and ΔKt = (yKt - yJt) = yJt(h – 1) > 0.    (4) 
                                                 
3Difference of ρKt from RJt may be noted.  In the former (latter) income ratio, we take the 
richer (poorer) country’s income in the numerator.  
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Subtracting the income ratio for year t from that for year t + 1, we have 
(ρKt+1 -  ρKt) = (yKt+1 yJt - yJt+1 yKt)/ yJt+1 yJt     (5), 
 sign (ρKt+1 -  ρKt) = sign (yKt+1 yJt - yJt+1 yKt).     (6) 
 The sign of (6) indicates relative divergence or relative convergence.  When it is positive 
(negative), the richer-poorer country income ratio is increasing (decreasing), and we have relative 
divergence (relative convergence).   
  Let δyJ and δyK be the change in the two countries income from year t to t + 1.  That is, 
 yJt+1 = yJt + δyJ and yKt+1 = yKt + δyK,      (7) 
Then, Country K’s income excess over that for Country J in year t + 1, is 
ΔKt+1 = yKt+1 - yJt+1 = ΔKt + δyK - δyJ  
Consider now absolute convergence/divergence.  Subtracting the income gap for year t 
from that for year t + 1, we have 
(ΔKt+1 - ΔKt) = (δyK - δyJ),       (8). 
 The sign of (8) indicates absolute divergence or absolute convergence.  When it is positive 
(negative), the richer-poorer country income gap is increasing (decreasing), and we have absolute 
divergence (absolute convergence).   
 Substituting (7) and (4) on the right-hand side of (6) and simplifying, we get 
 sign (yKt+1 yJt - yJt+1 yKt) = sign yJt (δyK – h δyJ) = sign (δyK – h δyJ)  (9) 
 We can re-state the condition for relative divergence/convergence in terms of the sign of  
the last term on the right-hand side of (9), (δyK – h δyJ).  When it is positive (negative), the richer-





3.  Relationship Between Different Convergence Concepts 
 Relative convergence occurs when the income of the poor country (Country J) weighted 
by the ratio, h, between the income of the rich country (Country K) and that of the poor country 
increases more than that of the rich country.  In symbols, the condition of relative convergence can 
be written as: 
 h δyJ > δyK         (10). 
The above condition is equivalent to  
 (δyJ/yJ) > (δyK/yK), or rJ > rK       (10́), 
 where rJ and rK are the (proportionate) growth rates in per capita income of Country J and K, 
respectively. That is, relative convergence is equivalent to considering that the income growth rate 
of the poor country is higher than the growth rate of the rich country. 
 Absolute convergence requires more simply that the income of the poor country increases 
more than that of the rich country, that is: 
 δyJ > δyK         (11). 
We now derive the relationships between relative and absolute convergence.  This  
relationship is given by relationship between the right-hand sides of (8) and (9).  We discuss the 
two situations below: 
A. Relative convergence, (δyK – h δyJ) < 0, and absolute convergence: (δyK - δyJ) < 0: 
Start with relative convergence, i.e., assume (δyK – h δyJ) < 0.  Given that h >1, the relative 
convergence condition can be met irrespective of whether δyJ is greater, equal or smaller than δyK, 
i.e., irrespective of whether we have absolute convergence, absolute divergence, and neither 
absolute convergence nor absolute divergence.  Relative convergence is not a sufficient condition 
for absolute convergence. 
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Now, examine the necessary condition for absolute convergence.  Consider the sign of (δyK 
– h δyJ) as unknown.  Start with assuming it to be zero.  Given that h > 1, (δyK – h δyJ) = 0 means 
δyJ is smaller than δyK and we have absolute divergence. Similarly, (δyK – h δyJ) > 0 means δyJ is 
smaller than δyK and absolute divergence.  Only if (δyK – h δyJ) < 0 can δyJ is greater than δyK and 
we can have absolute convergence.  Thus, relative convergence is a necessary condition for 
absolute convergence.  Higher growth rate of the poorer country (i.e., relative convergence) is 
necessary to ensure absolute convergence, but not sufficient especially when the gap between the  
gap between rich and poor countries is initially high. 
B. Relative divergence, (δyK – h δyJ) > 0, and absolute divergence: (δyK - δyJ) > 0: 
Relative divergence clearly implies absolute divergence (since h > 1).  That is, relative  
divergence is a sufficient condition for absolute divergence.  For the necessary part, let the sign of 
(δyK – h δyJ) again be unknown.  As shown above, if it is zero or positive, δyJ is smaller than δyK 
and we have absolute divergence.  For the third case of a negative (δyK – h δyJ) (i.e., relative 
convergence), the relative magnitudes of δyJ and δyK are unknown.  Then, we can have δyJ < δyK, 
i.e., we can have absolute divergence.  We have absolute divergence when there is no relative 
convergence/divergence (and (δyK – h δyJ) = 0); and we can have absolute divergence when there 
is relative convergence.  Thus, relative divergence (although  sufficient) is not necessary for 
absolute divergence.  
When there is no relative convergence/divergence, δyK = h δyJ and δyJ is smaller than δyK.  
That is, when the income ratio is unchanged, income gap increases and we have absolute 
divergence.  On the other hand, when there is no absolute convergence/divergence, δyJ = δyK, and 
(δyK – h δyJ) < 0.  Thus, when income gap remains the same, the poorer country grows faster, and 
we have relative convergence. 
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We summarize these results as 
Proposition 1: Relative convergence is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for absolute  
convergence, and relative divergence is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for absolute 
divergence.   
 Now, we compare the catch-up index to income ratios and β-convergence. 
The catch-up index is not a country’s income ratio to the frontier’s – it is the ratio of the 
said ratio for a year to a similar ratio for the base year.  Income ratios between rich and poor 
countries have the problem of income transitions, viz. a country moving from one group to the 
other, or even the richest and the poorest country changing, over time.  When select groups of 
countries are used, one rich and the other poor, the income ratios will be sensitive to how the 
country-groups are delineated.  By calculating it for each country with reference to one bench-
mark country, the catch-up index avoids these problems.  It also absorbs shocks to the entire region 
or to the whole world.  By expressing change in each country’s income ratios as an index, the 
indices for different countries can be combined to get a region’s catch-up.  Income ratios cannot 
be so combined. 
 β-convergence is theory-based.  Neo-classical theory predicts per capita incomes become 
equal to one another in the long-run, independent of their initial conditions; but gives no guidance 
for determining the years to achieve income equality.  See, Galor (1996).  The catch-up index 
shows what the historical facts reveal.  Using it, we can derive an equation to determine years for 
income equality or years for full convergence. 
 Let rI represent the annual (proportionate) catching-up rate, i.e., growth rate of the catch-
up index (defined by (3)) of Country J to the bench-mark country since the base year 0, and rBM 
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the corresponding (proportionate) growth rates in per capita income of the bench-mark country.  
Then, it can be shown that  
 rI = rJ - rBM.         (12) 
(12) shows the catching-up rate depends on our choice of the bench-mark country: Higher is the 
growth rate of the selected bench-mark country, lower is the catching-up rate.  Let n be the year 
Country J’s income becomes equal to the frontier’s.  From (1́) and (3),  
RJ,n= 1         (1́́ ́) 
IJ,n = (1/ RJ,0)          (3́). 
Using the compound growth expression and solving for n,  
 IJ,n = IJ,0 ( 1 + rI)
n = ( 1 + rI)
n 
n = log (1/RJ,0) / log(1 + rI)       (13) 
 (13) shows that a) the number of years for full convergence (for income to equal the 
frontier’s) depends not only on the catching-up (relative growth) rate but also on the initial 
conditions; and b) higher is the catching-up rate and/or higher is the initial income ratio, smaller 
is the number of years for full convergence.4  These results are stated in the following proposition:  
Proposition 2: a) The number of years for full convergence (for income to equal the frontier’s) 
depends not only on the catching-up (relative growth) rate but also on the initial conditions - in 
contrast from the neo-classical theory’s prediction of eventual equality of incomes across countries 
that is independent of initial conditions; and b) higher is the catching-up rate and/or higher is the 
initial income ratio, smaller is the number of years for full convergence. 
                                                 
 4Of the two factors, higher catching-up rate is more important since its effect cumulates 
over the years. 
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 Barro (2015, p. 911) uses the phrase “iron law of convergence,” under which “countries 
eliminate gaps in levels of real per capita GDP at a rate around 2% per year.  Convergence at a 
2% rate implies that it takes 35 years for half of an initial gap to vanish and 115 years for 90% to 
disappear.”  Nevertheless, a 2% higher growth rate does not mean income gap is decreasing by 
2% each year: it may take generations of growth at the higher rate before income gaps start 
decreasing.  Rather than a “law of convergence,” Barro’s iron law is simply an arithmetic fact that 
any real-valued number that decreases by 2% each year will become about 50% of its initial value 
in 35 years and 10% of its initial value in 115 years. 
 We next show neo-classical convergence gives relative convergence, not absolute.  
Irrespective of whether it is unconditional or conditional, neo-classical convergence states a poorer 
country tends to grow faster.  Using our notation and (4), neo-classical convergence can be stated 
as 
 (δyK / yK,t) < (δyJ / yJ,t)       (14) 
 (yJ,t δyK - yK,t δyJ) = yJt (δyK – h δyJ) < 0     (14́) 
 The algebraic expression on the left of the inequality sign in (14́) is the same as that on the 
right hand side of (9).  We have seen above that when (9) is negative, we have relative convergence.  
That is, neo-classical convergence and relative convergence are equivalent statements.  Similarly, 
neo-classical divergence and relative divergence are equivalent statements.  Using Proposition 1, 
neo-classical convergence only indicates richer-poorer country income ratio is decreasing; it has 
no implication for whether or not richer-poorer country income gap is decreasing (i.e., whether 
(δyK - δyJ) < 0). 
 No simple algebraic expression (like we have derived for years for full convergence) can 
be derived for the number of years of relative convergence it would take for absolute income gap 
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to starts decreasing.  A heuristic exercise (with numbers based on what we calculate below) shows 
if the US is the bench-mark country and its initial income is $24,000, Country J’s $300, and the 
catch-up rate is 1%, it will take 409 years of relative convergence (at 1% annual rate) for absolute 
convergence to start.  On the other hand, if Country J’s initial income is $4,800 and the catch-up 
rate is 5%, it will take 9 years of relative convergence (at 5% annual rate) for absolute convergence 
to start.  Clearly, even if we know the relative convergence rate, no statement about absolute 
convergence, e.g., for the income gap to even start decreasing, can be made without knowing the 
initial income difference. 
 Sala-i-Martin (2002, p. 36) states “As China and India grew (at a faster rate than the rich 
world), the incomes of their numerous citizens tended to converge to those of the citizens of the 
rich world.” Suppose China or India’s initial income was $1,200 and that of the US $24,000.  (In 
1971, US PPP PCY was $24,185, and that of China and India were $1,342 and $1,299, 
respectively). Then, if they were growing at a consistently faster 5 % rate, their incomes will 
diverge from the US for 37 years.  On the other hand, if they were growing at a consistently faster 
1 % rate only, their incomes will diverge from the US for 266 years, etc.  Faster growth is consistent 
with absolute divergence. 
 In the β-convergence literature, Artadi and Sala-i-Martin (2003), use the phrase absolute 
divergence with the same meaning given above (i.e., an increase in rich-poor income gap).  Barro 
(2015), Galor (1996), Sala-i-Martin (1996) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin, (1992) use absolute 
convergence to mean unconditional (full) convergence of per capita incomes of countries to one 
another in the long-run independent of their  initial conditions.  For example, Barro (2015, 911) 
states “This convergence [at 2% rate for US states] was absolute in the sense of not having 
to be conditioned on a set of variables that capture differences in long-run positions.”  
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Following this definition and imperative, β-convergence regressions (irrespective of whether they 
are unconditional or conditional) have interpreted the convergence shown by such regressions to 
be absolute convergence (see, Sala-i-Martin, 1996, for example)  
 Other differences between the catch-up index and β-convergence may be noted.  The catch-
up index measures rich-poor convergence; β-convergence measures within-group convergence.  
Since regression analysis measures the average relationship between the regressand and the 
regressors, even if the β-regression coefficient has the right sign, it only means average relative 
convergence for a group of countries.  It does not mean every poorer country’s income ratio with 
the richer country is increasing; and at the same rate.  Relative convergence shown by it may be 
due to richer countries in the sample increasing their income ratio with still richer countries while 
lower-level poorer countries are falling behind both relatively and absolutely (since relative 
divergence is sufficient for absolute divergence).5  In contrast, an increasing catch-up index 
ensures the necessary condition for absolute income gap to decrease is met.  β-convergence is not 
directly helpful for examining poor-rich country income gaps; even though, many works on it 
motivate their contributions by highlighting as if their focus is on poor-rich country income gaps.  
For example, the first paragraph of Sala-i-Martin (1996) is wholly on this question.   
 Some other advantages of the catch-up index are: Being an index, individual unique indices  
can be combined to yield information on a group or a region’s catch-up to the frontier. Growth 
rates (and income ratios) cannot be similarly combined since the base values will be different.  
                                                 
 5Quah (1996) makes the related point that average shown by β-convergence regression 
hides that the long-run economic development process in poorer countries may occur differently 




Pritchett (2000), Hausmann et al. (2005), Jerzmanowski, (2006), and Jones and Olken (2008) 
highlight turning points, ubiquitous “miracles” and “failures” of growth experience, within-
country regime changes, and variety of “states” of developing countries and note β-convergence 
regressions have limited usefulness to illuminate any of these phenomenon.  The catch-up index 
is calculated year by year and so it helps in understanding within country/region variation over 
time.  Catch-up index (or its growth rate) regressions can be run with it as the dependent variable 
and variables found to be useful explaining catching-up over the long period (more than twenty 
years).  For example, Jerzmanowski, (2006) finds such factors to be institutions, education, 
development of financial institutions, and geography, and Summers (2003) openness, sound 
money, and property rights. 
4. Catch-up Index for South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa 
Index by Countries 
We now construct the catch-up index for South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa; first by 
countries.  The index is based on PWT 9.0 (available at http://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt).  
Starting with version 8.0 (the new generation), PWT gives two versions of real GDP: using prices 
that are constant across countries but depend on the current year, CGDP; and using prices that are 
constant across countries and are also constant over time, RGDP.  The R variables are well-suited 
for comparisons across countries and over time (see, Feenstra, et al. (2015)), and we use them.   
We first take US as the frontier (and explain this choice and use an alternative bench-mark 
country below).   RGDP data for six countries in South Asia and 40 in Sub-Saharan Africa6 since 
                                                 
6RGDP data for six countries in the two regions with 1990 population of less than 0.50 m. 
are considered too sensitive to exceptional factors, and is not used.  These are, with 1990 
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the earliest year it is available are used.  PWT 9.0 computes RGDP from 1950 (earliest) to 2014; 
for 10 of these 46 countries it is available since 1950.    Annual catch-up index shows sharp changes 
in some years/countries.  These swings are explained by a country’s business cycle not 
synchronizing with the US, fluctuations in GDP caused by fluctuations in FDI and capital flows 
to some countries, sudden resource discoveries and primary products’ price changes, political 
upheavals and civil-wars in a country/group of countries in a year.  For example, Kant (2016) 
reports FDI as a proportion of GDP varies from -5.89 to 22.82 for developing countries even when 
averaged over four years.  A three-year average of a country’s per-capita RGDP centered on base 
year, and of US per-capita RGDP centered on each country’s base year, are used.  The ratio of the 
two gives us the base per capita RGDP ratio for a country.  The index was computed to 2014; its 
three-year 2013- centered average is used as the final value.  
Table 1US gives the computed catch-up index for 2013 by country (and related results) 
with the first year data are available for a country as the base year - in two panels; A. for South 
Asia and B. for Sub-Saharan Africa.  One can interpret the first row of its Panel A. is as follows.  
During the 53 years since 1960, Bangladesh’s PPP per capita income relative to the frontier fell 
from 100 to 66, or by 0.78% per year, and frontier/Bangladesh income ratio rose from about 12 to 
18.5 times.  For countries with base years between 1951 to 1961, the worst case of falling behind 
in South Asia is Bangladesh; and the worst three in Sub-Saharan Africa are Central African 
Republic, Niger, and Democratic Republic of Congo.  The five such countries in the two regions 
with non-negligible catching-up are (with rates in parenthesis), Botswana (4.78%), Congo  
                                                 
population in the parenthesis, Cabo Verde (0.34m.), Comoros (0.42m.), Equatorial Guinea, 
(0.38m), Maldives (0.22m.), Sao Tome and Principe (0.11m.), and Seychelles (0.07m.). 
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(0.90%), Gabon (1.14%), India (0.88%), and Lesotho (0.65%). 
<Insert Table 1US here.> 
Table 1US gives catching-up rates over a long period - a maximum of 62 years.  We next 
inquire whether the catching-up performance is different over more recent periods.  We consider 
two sub-periods: 1971 to 2013 (42 years or about two-thirds of 62), and 1992 to 2013 (21 years or 
about one-third of 62).  Both 1971 and 1992 were normal years and qualify as base year - in neither 
year the US experienced a recession.  Figures 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b give similar information as Table 
1US but with 1971 and 1992 as the base years, respectively.7  (Results behind the figures is in the 
online Appendix Tables 1US and 2US).  Vertical axis in the figures measures the income ratio, 
and the horizontal axis the catch-up rate.  Since the income ratios are with respect to the same 
bench-mark country (the US), comparison of data points for a year vertically in a figure shows 
relative income levels of countries in that year.  For example, measuring the diamonds along the 
vertical axis, Figure 1a shows the South Asian countries were arranged in the following order in 
1971 when ranked from the poorest to the richest:  Nepal, India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Pakistan, 
and Sri Lanka.  At the same time, comparison of different catch-up rates shows the relative growth 
rates, since the reference country (the US) is the same for all countries.  Then, β-convergence as 
applied to these figures means lower is the diamond (i.e., lower the 1992 income level), further to 
the right should a country be positioned.  Similar inference is obtained by comparing countries in 
either region in the two tables.  
<Insert Figures 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b here.> 
                                                 
7To make Figure 1b easier to read, results for Botswana are not shown in it.  Botswana’s 
1971-2013 catch-up rate is 4.79 and US/Botswana income ratios are 2502 (1971) and 351 (2013) 
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 None of the tables/figures meet the expectations of β-convergence.  We can also run β- 
convergence regressions for either region.  They can either be of the catching-up rates on income  
ratios or of PCY growth rates (obtained by subtracting the US PCY growth rate from the catching-
up rates) on the initial PCY levels.  None of these regression equations are statistically significant.  
Table 1US, figures, and β-convergence regressions do not support within region convergence in 
either region. 
At the same time, our analysis gives meaningful results about catching-up/falling-behind 
the frontier.  Since the initial base year (see, Table 1US), four of the six South Asian countries 
have either fallen behind or caught-up at miniscule rates giving 2729 to 5184 years for full 
convergence or income equality with the US; so have 33 of the 40 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
In Figures 1a and 1b (i.e., since 1971, see also Results behind Figure 1 - Appendix Table 1US), 
countries with the worst performance (i.e., worst falling behind) in South Asia/worst three in Sub-
Saharan Africa are almost the same (as in Table 1US) with Liberia, that has 1965 as the base year, 
replacing Niger.  In South Asia, although the worst performer (Bangladesh) is the same, its falling-
back rate is about one-half point lower and other countries’ catching-up rates are about one-half 
point higher since 1971 than they were in Table 1US.  The additional Sub-Saharan countries 
showing catching-up are, with the rate in the parenthesis, Mauritius (1.46%), Swaziland (1.14%), 
Sudan (0.53%), and Mali (0.51%).  Of these, data is available for Swaziland and Sudan only since 
1971 while Mali fell-behind from 1961 to 2013.8   The other 32 (of the 40) Sub-Saharan countries 
have fallen behind from 1971 to 2013 too; and more than one-half of 37 countries with data start  
                                                 
8It may be noted although both Mali and Sudan exhibit about the same catching up rate 
since 1971, at these rates it will take Sudan 543 years to reach US income and Mali 744.  The 
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years from 1951 to 1961 fall-behind at a higher rate (and, in one case - Gabon - catch up at a lower 
rate) during 1971-2013 than during 1951 to 1961 to 2013.   
All six South Asian countries show catching-up since 1992 (see, Figures 2a and 2b and 
Results behind Figure 2 - Appendix Table 2US), i.e., Bangladesh changes from falling-behind in 
the earlier two periods to catching-up.  The catching-up rate for all increases significantly (by 
about one point or more) from the 1971-2013 rate.  In Sub- Saharan Africa, one country 
(Swaziland) changes from catching-up for the 1971-2013 period to falling-behind for 1992-2013 
and 14 from falling-behind to catching-up.   Two countries’ (Botswana and Mauritius) catching-
up rate decreases significantly and four countries’ falling-behind rate increases - for two 
significantly.  The three countries with the worst falling behind since 1992, Zimbabwe (-5.26%), 
Central African Republic (-3.01%), and Guinea (-3.28%) are partly the same.  The best three 
performers are Nigeria, Zambia, and Angola; all three of them fell behind over the longer period 
(since either 1971 or 1951). 
The above analysis shows that depending on the choice of the base year, the conclusions 
regarding convergence/divergence may be contradictory.  The catch-up rate is the excess (or short 
fall) of a country’s income’s growth rate over the bench mark country.  US as the bench mark is 
attractive because it is getting steadily richer at about 2% yearly since 1951.  Then the same country 
that is catching-up from one base year, may be falling-behind from another base year because it 
gets richer at more than 2% from one base year and at less than 2% (or even gets poorer) from 
another base year. 
                                                 
reason for the difference is Mali was much poorer to start with: In 1971, US income was about 45 
times Mali’s while “only” about 18 times Sudan’s.  
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The catching-up rates are also different from different base years.  Generally, catching-up 
rates since 1992 are higher than those since either 1951-1961 or 1971.  The median years for full 
convergence of the 28 countries catching-up since 1992 is 187 years.  We do not consider it 
advisable to project for the next 187 years what a country has been able to achieve over the 21 
years (1992-2013) period - we ought to consider its experience over the past 187 years to project 
187 years in the future.  Since we have reliable data for these countries for a maximum of 62 years, 
we ought to use at least this performance for projecting into the future.  Comparison of Table 1US 
and Figures 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b (and Appendix Tables 1US and 2US) shows that of the 28 countries 
showing catching-up since 1992, 21 fell behind since 1951/their earliest base year (or caught up at 
miniscule rates).  The seven countries that show non-minuscule catching up since the earliest base 
year, with the time for income equality with the US in parenthesis, are Bhutan (158 years), 
Botswana (79 years), Congo (317 years), Gabon (161 years), India (329 years), Lesotho (529 
years), and Sudan (543 years).  Their catching-up rates over the longer period is, in five out of 
seven countries, one-fifth (India) to about one-half (Bhutan and Lesotho) of that for 1992-2013.   
The caching-up of these countries is by no means steady at the 1992-2013 rates since the earlier 
base years also.  The catching-up achieved in the 1992-2013 period is fragile.   
We show income growth acceleration or “miracle” even over 21 years does not mean 
catching-up over a longer period.   Jones and Olken (2008) show growth “miracles” and “failures” 
are ubiquitous at ten- and fifteen-year periods.  Hausmann et al. (2005) classify growth 
acceleration-episodes (above average growth for eight years) by whether they had negative, poor, 
or above average growth in the preceding eight and the following 10 years.  Easterly et al. (1993) 
find poor correlations between growth rates across decades.  Our results add to this literature that 
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to examine long term economic development and catching-up, we should study countries’ 
experience over periods longer than 21 years, and maybe at least thirty years.  
We next consider whether the full convergence time could be shorter with some other rich 
country as the bench mark.  Of the OECD-24 (original OECD-21 plus Japan, Australia, and New 
Zealand), PWT data since 1950 is available for 23; but many do not satisfy (2).9  Of those that do, 
three countries with the lowest PCY growth rate are New Zealand, Australia, and US (in that 
order).  We select New Zealand as the alternative bench mark country so that our sample countries’ 
catching-up rates are the highest and full convergence time the shortest.  New Zealand also did not 
suffer recession in either 1971 or in 1992 - these years can be used as alternative base years for it 
too. 
Tables 1NZ and Appendix Tables 1NZ and 2NZ, give results similar to Tables 1US and 
Appendix Tables 1US and 2US, respectively; but with New Zealand as the bench mark country.  
Comparing Table  1NZ to 1US and  Appendix Table 1NZ to Appendix Table 1US, with New 
Zealand as the bench mark country, the catching-up rate is uniformly higher, the falling-back rate 
is uniformly lower, and the time for full convergence uniformly shorter.10  For countries with an 
year from 1951-1961 as the initial base-year, the median full convergence time (for all countries 
                                                 
 9Data since 1950 is not available for Greece.  Among the countries that do not meet (2) 
are Italy, Japan, Portugal, and Spain - their incomes are lower than those of Mauritius and South 
Africa in 1950s.  
 10The convergence/divergence countries since 1971 are the same as with US as the 
bench-mark country.  With a base year from 1951-1961, one additional country, Mauritania, 
shows non-minuscule catching-up. 
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in the two regions that converge) decreases from 689 to 491 years; and with 1971 as the base year, 
from 276 to 176 years. 
<Insert Table 1NZ here.> 
Comparison is different with 1992 as the base year.  Comparing Appendix Table 2NZ to 
Appendix Table 2US, when New Zealand is used as the bench mark country instead of the US, the 
catching-up rate since 1992 is everywhere lower and the full convergence time generally longer; 
and the median full convergence time (for countries catching up) increases from 187 to 218 years. 
Six countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mauritius, Rwanda, and South Africa) fall-
behind New Zealand since 1992 even though they catch-up to the US for this period.  The reason 
for these different results is New Zealand’s faster income growth than the US since 1992: US 
suffered Great Recession in 2008-2009 from which it recovered its 2007 income level only in 
2013; New Zealand’s 2008 recession was so mild that the three year moving average of its income 
did not decline in any year, and its 2013 income was about 112% of the 2007 level.  These differing 
results since 1992 when the bench-mark country changes reinforce that to examine catching up to 
any bench mark country, we should examine a country’s performance over at least 30 years.  
Region’s Catch-Up Index 
 
The region-wide averages and dispersion for the country performance when US (New 
Zealand) is the bench-mark country are presented in the six panels of Table 2US (Table 2NZ).  
Geometric mean (GM) is preferred11 as the average since it is not affected by extreme values (e.g., 
                                                 
11GM has an additional advantage in this paper, since (GM of IJt) = (GM of RJt) ÷ (GM of 
RJ0), J = 1, . . N, where N is the number of countries.  Similar relationships between the index 
and the two income ratios do not exist for their either median or arithmetic mean.   
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GM of 8, 27, and 125 is 30) while the median does not incorporate values of other observations in 
it and can be significantly affected by the inclusion/exclusion of an observation.  As discussed 
above, this paper’s focus is on inter-country income inequality.  Nevertheless, we discuss the 
population weighted GM of the catch-up index and the region/frontier income ratios and the time 
for full convergence with the bench mark country towards the end of this section.12 
<Insert Tables 2US and 2NZ here.> 
Emphasizing the historical experience since the initial base year (due to fragility shown 
above), the average catch-up index in 2013 is 118 - with US as the bench-mark (135 - with New 
Zealand as the bench-mark) for South Asia giving 0.30% (0.55%) as the annual catching-up rate 
and 865 (425) years for full convergence or equality with the frontier’s income; that for Sub-
Saharan Africa is 60 (70) with falling-behind annual rate of 0.96% (0.67%) and no possibility of 
income-equality with the frontier.  When median is used instead of the GM, the catching-up rate 
for South Asia since 1951 decreases, and the falling back rate for Sub-Saharan Africa increases.  
For South Asia, with US as the bench-mark, it decreases to 0.08; and this mere 0.22 points decrease 
in the catch-up rate increases the years for income equality with US (full convergence) from 865 
to 3152.  With 1971 as the base year, the annual catching-up is about as negative for Sub-Saharan 
Africa as it is since 1951 with either country as the bench-mark, but is more positive for South 
Asia.  The catching-up for the period since 1992 is quite different when New Zealand is used as 
the bench mark country instead of the US.  The rate decreases for both the regions.  For South 
                                                 
12Extreme values affect the weighted arithmetic mean even more strongly by since the 
weights may also be extreme.  For example, the population-weights of India and Nigeria are 
about 77% in the two regions, respectively.   
23 
 
Asia, the full convergence time increases from 115 to 125 years.  Sub-Saharan Africa changes 
from catching-up – the only period it shows catching-up to the US - to falling behind.  Since 1992, 
it catches-up to the US at 0.41% rate annually; but falls behind New Zealand at 0.24% rate.  
.  Sala-i-Martin (1990, 1996) defines σ–convergence/divergence as a decrease/increase in  
dispersion of real per capita incomes over time.  The dispersion of country PPP PC incomes in a 
region is given in Tables 2US (and 2NZ) by the standard deviation (scaled by geometric mean) of 
the income ratios in the three base-years and in 2013.  For South Asia, it was almost the same from 
1951 to 1971, fell slightly from 1971 to 1992 and increased sharply from 1992 to 2013 - in 2013 
it was 25% (= 63.0/50.4) higher than in 1951.  A generally similar picture is presented by Sub-
Saharan Africa – in 2013, it was about 15% (= 90.7/78.7) higher than in 1951.  These regions not 
only failed to catch-up to the frontier in a meaningful way or fell behind the frontier sharply, their 
intra-regional incomes also became more dispersed.  Barro (2015) clarifies the iron law takes the 
form of unconditional absolute convergence for a group of countries that are reasonably 
homogeneous.  Countries in either of these two regions are reasonably homogeneous.  Yet, they  
do not exhibit unconditional absolute convergence.  
Barro (2015) shows conditional convergence for a sample of 89 countries for the 1970-75 
to 2005-10 period – conditional on eleven variables described there-in while not including either 
labor/population growth rate or technology.  As explained above, the convergence shown by such 
a regression is within group relative convergence rather than absolute convergence. He includes 
high income countries that Pritchet (1997) shows exhibit absolute convergence and considerable 
movement towards income-equality with the US and excludes 19 countries from Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia – included here - for which data are available in PWT 8/8.1 and 7.0.   
Conditional (relative) convergence shown by him may be due to the country-sample used and the 
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specific (eleven) controls included.  As noted above, β-convergence does not mean every poorer 
country in the sample has experienced relative convergence; or at the same rate.  Further, as noted 
by Quah (1996, p. 1048) “[A]s for conditional convergence, even in the best of all possible 
scenarios, all it could show is whether each country converges to its own steady state, different 
from that of other countries. It is a complete puzzle how this can be interesting for whether the 
poor are catching up with the rich.” 
 The above analyzes unweighted regional catching-up/falling-behind.  It examines whether 
per capita incomes of countries in a region on average, unweighted by anything, are catching-up 
or falling-behind the bench mark country.  The emphasis is on countries rather than on the number 
of persons resident in each one of them.  Weighted regional catching-up, when weights are 
populations, takes account of the number of people living in each country.  Let wit represent the 
regional population-weight of Country i, i = 1, 2, . . . . N, at time t, t = 0, 1, . . . . T, where N is the 
number of countries in the region.  The population-weighted geometric mean is 
 Weighted GM = Π Iitwit =  Π Ritwit /Π Ri0wit     (15) 
where each product is taken with respect to i.  That is, the population weighted geometric mean of 
the catch-up index of a region for year t is the ratio of the weighted GM of each country’s income-
ratios to the bench-mark country’s income for year t to similar weighted GM for the base year.   
Unweighted regional catch-up index and full convergence time computed earlier gives the 
same weight to each country’s catching-up.  In population weighted GM, a more populous 
country’s catching-up is given more importance  in the regional average - the regional average is 
more influenced by the more populous country.  Whether population weighted GM or unweighted 
GM is used makes for a substantial difference in the results; the year whose population-weights 
are used does not - since a country’s share of a region’s population does not change much over the 
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years.  We choose 1990 for the population-weights since it is almost in the middle of 1971, the 
year from which we have data for all countries, and 2013, the final year. 13 
Compared to unweighted GMs, in both Tables 2US and 2NZ, for 1951-2013 and 1971-
2013, the weighted GMs for Sub-Saharan Africa show a higher falling back rate; for South Asia 
they show a higher catching up rate.  Those for 1992 show a sharply higher catching up rate in 
both the regions.  These results follow from those for India and Nigeria in Tables 1US and 1NZ 
and in the various figures and appendix tables since their weight in the respective region’s 
population is about 77%.  India catches-up at a greater rate than the unweighted GM for South 
Asia for each period (and against either bench-mark country) pushing-up the weighted average; 
Nigeria falls back during 1971-2013 at a greater rate, and catches-up during 1992-2013 at a 
substantially greater rate, than the unweighted GM for Sub Saharan Africa (against either bench-
mark country) pushing-up both the weighted average falling-back rate during 1971-2013 and the 
weighted average catching-up rate during 1992-2013. 
We have explained above that we disregard the 1992-2013 performance partly because the 
performance over the longer period is quite different and partly because the better catching-up to 
the US in this period is due to its slow recovery from the 2008-2009 Great Recession.  Sub-Saharan 
Africa shows falling back over both 1951-2013 and 1971-2013, and at a higher rate, even when 
we consider the population weighted GM.  The better population weighted catching-up rate for 
South Asia for 1951-2013 does not mean South Asia is projected to reach full income convergence 
                                                 
13Tables US 2 and 2NZ shows the results with 1990 population weights.  Those with 
alternative population weights, e.g. those for 2013, are almost identical, and are available from 
the author on request. 
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with the US in about 400 years and with New Zealand in 263 years.  The population-weighted 
projections for the two regions, or even the unweighted projections, given in Tables 2US and 2NZ 
have no operational meaning - since each country follows its independent policies.  The projection 
given in Tables 1US and 1NZ dominate – that India is projected to reach income equality with the 
US (New Zealand) in 329 (237) years, Pakistan in 5184 (780) years, etc.  
4. Conclusions 
The dominant method for about 25 years to test empirically the neo-classical proposition 
that poorer countries tend to grow faster has been β-convergence regressions.  This literature 
asserts/implies the convergence shown is in income levels and go so far as to assert an “iron law 
of convergence” under which a 2% faster growing poorer country eliminates 50% of income gap 
in 35 years and 90% in 115 years.  We point out faster growth of poorer countries only means their 
income ratios with the richer countries are increasing.  We call it relative convergence, show neo-
classical convergence is relative convergence, and that relative convergence is a necessary but not 
a sufficient condition for income gap reduction (absolute convergence) which depends on initial 
conditions also.   
β-convergence regressions have limited usefulness estimating poorer-richer country 
(relative) convergence – the regression result may be driven by richer countries converging with 
still richer countries in the sample while the lower-level poorer countries are diverging both 
relatively and absolutely (since relative divergence is sufficient for absolute divergence).  The 
catch-up index directly measures poor-rich convergence, can measure within-group convergence, 
and unlike the β-convergence, is computed year by year and can help us understand the dynamics 
and within country/region income variation and inequality over time.  The neo-classical theory 
predicts eventual equality of incomes that is independent of the initial conditions and gives no 
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guidance for predicting years for full convergence (eventual equality of incomes).  The catch-up 
index is used to derive an equation for years for full convergence and shows full convergence years 
depend on the initial conditions too.   
 Using PWT 9.0 and computing catch-up index from 1951-61 to 2013, and its sub-periods, 
we show of the 28 (out of 46) countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia that show catching-
up from 1992 to 2013 when US is the bench-mark country, 21 fell behind over the longer period 
(or caught up at miniscule rates).  The catching-up rates in five out of rest of the seven countries 
since their base year, is one-fifth to about one-half of that for 1992-2013.  When New Zealand is 
used as the bench mark country, six countries that catch-up to the US from 1992-2013 fall-behind 
New Zealand during this period. Countries’ experience over more than 21 (maybe thirty years) 
should be examined to judge successful catching-up, and for projections into the future, the longest 
period of reliable data should be used.  Sub-Saharan Africa shows no possibility of catching-up 
from the earliest base period; South Asia does: at 0.30% (0.55%) annual rate giving 865 (425) 
years for full convergence when US (New Zealand) is the bench-mark country.  The sample 
excludes three countries (with 1990 population in parenthesis), Afghanistan (12.1m.), Eritrea 
(3.1m.), and Somalia (6.3m.), for which PWT data are unavailable; if they were, the two regions’ 
falling behind/lack of catch-up and within-region divergence would most likely increase.   
 Sub Saharan Africa has achieved faster growth in life expectancy, of 15.6% versus 9.5% 
for South Asia.   See, Kant (2018).  Nevertheless, Jones and Klenow (2016) find higher within 
country inequality in developing countries’ neutralizes their higher life expectancy growth; and 
for countries in their sample, their measure of well-being (that also considers leisure and 
inequality) has a correlation of .98 with real GDP per capita.  Real GDP per capita remains the 
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primary statistic of both catching-up and well-being.  Using it, we show how persistent inter-
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Country Base No. of Y-Equality
Year Yrs. Ind.2013 Gr. Rate w. US Years Base Year 2013
Bangladesh 1960 53 66 -0.78 1224 1843
Bhutan 1971 42 209 1.77 158 1612 769
India 1951 62 172 0.88 329 1777 1035
Nepal 1961 52 105 0.09 3465 2582 2458
Pakistan 1951 62 103 0.05 5184 1184 1147
Sri Lanka 1951 62 104 0.06 2729 562 539
Angola 1971 42 77 -0.62 505 660
Benin 1960 53 41 -1.67 1139 2801
Botswana 1961 52 1136 4.78 79 3984 351
Burkina Faso 1960 53 78 -0.47 2691 3461
Burundi 1961 52 43 -1.61 3001 6942
Cameroon 1961 52 72 -0.63 1427 1976
Cent. Afri. Rep. 1961 52 18 -3.24 1290 7339
Chad 1961 52 32 -2.17 860 2647
Congo 1961 52 159 0.90 317 1685 1057
Côte d'Ivoire 1961 52 61 -0.95 988 1625
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1951 62 16 -2.91 755 4799
Ethiopia 1951 62 101 0.02 23239 4166 4135
Gabon 1961 52 180 1.14 161 619 344
Gambia 1961 52 34 -2.05 1136 3316
Ghana 1956 57 51 -1.17 708 1391
Guinea 1960 53 23 -2.73 904 3856
Guinea-Bissau 1961 52 47 -1.44 1961 4132
Kenya 1951 62 48 -1.18 906 1899
Lesotho 1961 52 140 0.65 529 3062 2188
Liberia 1965 48 23 -3.02 1508 6431
Madagascar 1961 52 31 -2.23 1374 4439
Malawi 1955 58 40 -1.57 2131 5372
Mali 1961 52 91 -0.18 3309 3626
Mauritania 1961 52 97 -0.06 1616 1668
Mauritius 1951 62 109 0.14 848 325 300
Mozambique 1961 52 70 -0.68 3393 4853
Namibia 1961 52 86 -0.29 435 504
Niger 1961 52 20 -3.05 1243 6092
Nigeria 1951 62 59 -0.85 548 937
Rwanda 1961 52 55 -1.14 1869 3407
Senegal 1961 52 35 -2.00 823 2370
Sierra Leone 1962 51 58 -1.06 1880 3251
South Africa 1951 62 70 -0.57 296 425
Sudan 1971 42 125 0.53 543 1788 1432
Swaziland 1971 42 166 1.21 194 1042 627
Tanzania 1961 52 58 -1.04 1413 2420
Togo 1961 52 45 -1.52 1780 3945
Uganda 1951 62 56 -0.93 1604 2853
Zambia 1956 57 45 -1.39 644 1418
Zimbabwe 1955 58 33 -1.89 970 2908
Notes: Based on PWT 9.0 and derivations in the text. Base year is 1951 or the earliest data availability year.
Table 1US: Catch-up to US Index by Country 
Catch-Up Index US/Country PPP PCY
a. South Asia
b. Sub Saharan Africa
Country Base No. of Y-Equality
Year Yrs. Ind.2013 Gr. Rate w. NZ Years Base Year 2013
Bangladesh 1960 53 78 -0.47 947 1207
Bhutan 1971 42 221 1.91 128 1112 504
India 1951 62 197 1.10 237 1335 678
Nepal 1961 52 127 0.46 656 2043 1610
Pakistan 1951 62 119 0.28 780 893 751
Sri Lanka 1951 62 120 0.29 491 424 353
Angola 1971 42 81 -0.50 348 432
Benin 1960 53 48 -1.38 882 1835
Botswana 1961 52 1371 5.16 69 3151 230
Burkina Faso 1960 53 92 -0.16 2085 2267
Burundi 1961 52 52 -1.25 2373 4548
Cameroon 1961 52 87 -0.27 1129 1294
Cent. Afri. Rep. 1961 52 21 -2.96 1021 4785
Chad 1961 52 39 -1.79 680 1734
Congo 1961 52 193 1.27 205 1332 691
Côte d'Ivoire 1961 52 73 -0.60 781 1065
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1951 62 18 -2.73 564 3152
Ethiopia 1951 62 115 0.23 1526 3118 2709
Gabon 1961 52 217 1.50 107 490 225
Gambia 1961 52 41 -1.70 898 2171
Ghana 1956 57 57 -0.98 515 910
Guinea 1960 53 28 -2.37 701 2526
Guinea-Bissau 1961 52 57 -1.08 1552 2705
Kenya 1951 62 55 -0.96 680 1243
Lesotho 1961 52 169 1.01 316 2421 1433
Liberia 1965 48 28 -2.62 1185 4213
Madagascar 1961 52 37 -1.89 1087 2907
Malawi 1955 58 45 -1.37 1572 3514
Mali 1961 52 110 0.18 1781 2618 2374
Mauritania 1961 52 117 0.30 844 1278 1093
Mauritius 1951 62 125 0.36 249 245 196
Mozambique 1961 52 84 -0.33 2683 3181
Namibia 1961 52 104 0.08 1638 344 330
Niger 1961 52 25 -2.63 983 3989
Nigeria 1951 62 67 -0.64 411 613
Rwanda 1961 52 66 -0.80 1478 2232
Senegal 1961 52 42 -1.65 651 1553
Sierra Leone 1962 51 70 -0.70 1497 2129
South Africa 1951 62 80 -0.36 224 278
Sudan 1971 42 131 0.64 391 1233 939
Swaziland 1971 42 175 1.34 148 720 411
Tanzania 1961 52 71 -0.66 1118 1585
Togo 1961 52 54 -1.18 1408 2586
Uganda 1951 62 64 -0.72 1201 1868
Zambia 1956 57 50 -1.21 468 929
Zimbabwe 1955 58 38 -1.65 716 1906
Notes: as above.
Table 1NZ: Catch-up to New Zealand Index  by Country
Catch-Up Index NZ/Country PPP PCY
A. South Asia
B. Sub Saharan Africa
Average/Dispersion No. of Y-Equality
Yrs. Ind.2013 Gr. Rate w. US Years Base Year 2013
Geometric Mean 55 118 0.30 865 1349 1143
Std. Dev. 8 53 680 720
StdDev/GeoMean 14.7 45 50.4 63.0
1990Pop_Wtd. Geo. Mean 55 147 0.70 399 1631 1109
Geometric Mean 42 142 0.84 334 1623 1143
Std. Dev. 43 810 720
StdDev/GeoMean 30.4 49.9 63.0
1990Pop_Wtd. Geo. Mean 42 162 1.16 251 1795 1109
Geometric Mean 21 172 2.62 115 1970 1143
Std. Dev. 52 930 720
StdDev/GeoMean 30 47.2 63.0
1990Pop_Wtd. Geo. Mean 21 228 4.00 82 2523 1109
Geometric Mean 53 60 -0.96 1264 2110
Std. Dev. 5 174 994 1913
StdDev/GeoMean 9.8 290.8 78.7 90.7
1990Pop_Wtd. Geo. Mean 53 55 -1.12 1077 1959
Geometric Mean 42 66 -0.98 1385 2110
Std. Dev. 109 1035 1913
StdDev/GeoMean 166.3 74.8 90.7
1990Pop_Wtd. Geo. Mean 42 60 -1.21 1178 1959
Geometric Mean 21 109 0.41 765 2310 2110
Std. Dev. 99 2136 1913
StdDev/GeoMean 90.3 92.5 90.7
1990Pop_Wtd. Geo. Mean 21 154 2.08 166 3013 1959
Table 2US: Catch up to US Index - Averages & Dispersion
Note: 
a
 Later means from 1951 to 1961
Catch-Up Index US/Country PPP PCY
a. South Asia
a.1  Base Year = 1951 or Later
a
a.2  Base Year = 1971 
a.3  Base Year = 1992 
b.  Sub-Saharan Africa
b1.  Base Year = 1951 or Later
a
b2.  Base Year = 1971 
b3.  Base Year = 1992
Average/Dispersion No. of Y-Equality
Yrs. Ind.2013 Gr. Rate w. NZ Years Base Year 2013
Geometric Mean 55 135 0.55 425 1014 749
Std. Dev. 8 54 541 471
StdDev/GeoMean 14.7 39.9 53.4 63.0
1990Pop_Wtd. Geo. Mean 55 169 0.96 263 1230 726
Geometric Mean 42 150 0.97 250 1120 749
Std. Dev. 45 559 471
StdDev/GeoMean 30.3 49.9 63.0
1990Pop_Wtd. Geo. Mean 42 170 1.27 199 1239 726
Geometric Mean 21 150 1.95 125 1125 749
Std. Dev. 45 531 471
StdDev/GeoMean 29.9 47.2 63.0
1990Pop_Wtd. Geo. Mean 21 198 3.31 82 1441 726
Geometric Mean 53 70 -0.67 971 2110
Std. Dev. 5 210 780 1913
StdDev/GeoMean 9.8 299 80.3 90.7
1990Pop_Wtd. Geo. Mean 53 64 -0.84 815 1283
Geometric Mean 42 69 -0.88 956 2110
Std. Dev. 115 715 1913
StdDev/GeoMean 166.6 74.8 90.7
1990Pop_Wtd. Geo. Mean 42 63 -1.09 813 1283
Geometric Mean 21 95 -0.24 1318 1382
Std. Dev. 86 1217 1252
StdDev/GeoMean 90 92.3 90.6
1990Pop_Wtd. Geo. Mean 21 134 1.40 204 1719 1283
Table 2NZ: Catch up to New Zealand Index - Averages & Dispersion
A.3  Base Year = 1992 
B.  Sub-Saharan Africa
B1.  Base Year = 1951 or Later
a
B2.  Base Year = 1971 
Note: 
a
 Later means from 1951 to 1961
B3.  Base Year = 1992
Catch-Up Index NZ/Country PPP PCY
A. South Asia
A.1  Base Year = 1951 or Later
a
A.2  Base Year = 1971 
Note: Data points from left to right are for countries in the following order: Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, 
Sri Lanka, India, and Bhutan.
Note: Data points from left to right are for countries in the following order: Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh,




































FIGURE 1A:  CATCHING -UP/FALLING BEHIND TO US 





































FIGURE 2A:  CATCHING -UP/FALLING BEHIND TO US 
SOUTH ASIA ,  1992-2013
1992 2013
Note: Data points from left to right are for countries in the following order: Congo - DRC, Liberia, Central African Republic, Niger, Zimbabwe, Guinea, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Gambia, Togo, Guinea-Bissau, Chad, Benin, Burundi, Nigeria,  Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Zambia, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Mauritania, 






























































FIGURE 1B:  CATCHING-UP/FALLING-BEHIND TO US 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA,  1971 -2013
(EXCLUDING BOTSWANA)
1971 2013
Note Data points from left to right are for countries in the following order: Zimbabwe, Guinea, Central African Republic, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Congo-D.R.C., Malawi,
Niger, Togo, Senegal, Cameroon, Madagascar, Swaziland, Kenya, Chad, Ivory Coast,  Benin, Mauritania, Rwanda, South Africa, Burkina Faso, Mauritius, Gabon, Ethiopia, Mali, Ghana, Lesotho,
Tanzania, Namibia, Mozambique, Uganda, Botswana,  Sudan, Liberia, Congo, Zambia, and Angola.  Data for Nigeria is not shown due to the very large value (9.0) of its catch-up rate during
































































FIGURE 2B:  CATCHING -UP/FALLING -BEHIND TO US 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA,  1992 -2013
1992 2013
Country Y-Convergence
Ind. 2013 Gr. Rate w. US Years 1971 2013
Bangladesh 91 -0.22 1675 1843
Bhutan 209 1.77 158 1612 769
India 182 1.44 206 1879 1035
Nepal 132 0.66 526 3240 2458
Pakistan 118 0.39 662 1357 1147
Sri Lanka 152 1.00 211 818 539
Angola 77 -0.62 505 660
Benin 46 -1.83 1278 2801
Botswana 713 4.79 69 2502 351
Burkina Faso 91 -0.22 3143 3461
Burundi 49 -1.68 3396 6942
Cameroon 84 -0.41 1663 1976
Central African Republic 25 -3.25 1840 7339
Chad 44 -1.94 1165 2647
Congo 158 1.10 259 1673 1057
Côte d'Ivoire 57 -1.33 919 1625
Dem. Rep. of Congo 21 -3.65 1018 4799
Ethiopia 105 0.12 3245 4335 4135
Gabon 123 0.49 292 422 344
Gambia 40 -2.16 1312 3316
Ghana 64 -1.06 892 1391
Guinea 35 -2.47 1340 4132
Guinea-Bissau 43 -1.99 1766 4132
Kenya 67 -0.95 1274 1899
Lesotho 138 0.77 445 3023 2188
Liberia 24 -3.34 1545 6431
Madagascar 37 -2.34 1660 4439
Malawi 37 -2.34 1997 5372
Mali 124 0.51 744 4506 3626
Mauritania 61 -1.17 1019 1668
Mauritius 184 1.46 117 550 300
Mozambique 76 -0.65 3671 4853
Namibia 86 -0.36 435 504
Niger 29 -2.90 1762 6092
Nigeria 53 -1.50 498 937
Rwanda 73 -0.75 2477 3407
Senegal 60 -1.21 1415 2370
Sierra Leone 55 -1.41 1775 3251
South Africa 73 -0.75 309 425
Sudan 125 0.53 543 1788 1432
Swaziland 166 1.21 194 1042 627
Tanzania 55 -1.41 1339 2420
Togo 40 -2.16 1581 3945
Uganda 84 -0.41 2394 2853
Zambia 56 -1.37 788 1418
Zimbabwe 32 -2.68 941 2908
Catch-Up Index US/Country PPP PCY
Note: The base year for all countries in this Table is 1971 (and the number of years is 42).
a. South Asia
b. Sub Saharan Africa
Results Behind Figure 1 - Appendix Table 1US
Country Y-Convergence
Ind. 2013 Gr. Rate w. NZ Years Base Year 2013
Bangladesh 96 -0.10 1155 1207
Bhutan 221 1.91 128 1112 504
India 191 1.55 166 1297 678
Nepal 139 0.79 396 2235 1610
Pakistan 125 0.53 421 936 751
Sri Lanka 160 1.13 155 565 353
Angola 81 -0.50 348 432
Benin 48 -1.73 882 1835
Botswana 752 4.92 59 1729 230
Burkina Faso 96 -0.10 2170 2267
Burundi 51 -1.59 2342 4548
Cameroon 89 -0.28 1148 1294
Central African Republic 27 -3.07 1269 4785
Chad 46 -1.83 804 1734
Congo 167 1.23 1155 691
Côte d'Ivoire 60 -1.21 634 1065
Dem. Rep. of Congo 22 -3.54 702 3152
Ethiopia 110 0.23 1498 2993 2709
Gabon 129 0.61 176 291 225
Gambia 42 -2.04 905 2171
Ghana 68 -0.91 615 910
Guinea 37 -2.34 925 2526
Guinea-Bissau 45 -1.88 1218 2705
Kenya 71 -0.81 880 1243
Lesotho 146 0.91 337 2087 1433
Liberia 25 -3.25 1066 4213
Madagascar 39 -2.22 1146 2907
Malawi 39 -2.22 1379 3514
Mali 131 0.64 534 3107 2374
Mauritania 64 -1.06 703 1093
Mauritius 193 1.58 85 380 196
Mozambique 80 -0.53 2533 3181
Namibia 91 -0.22 300 330
Niger 30 -2.83 1215 3989
Nigeria 56 -1.37 344 613
Rwanda 77 -0.62 1709 2232
Senegal 63 -1.09 976 1553
Sierra Leone 58 -1.29 1225 2129
South Africa 77 -0.62 213 278
Sudan 131 0.64 391 1233 939
Swaziland 175 1.34 148 720 411
Tanzania 58 -1.29 924 1585
Togo 42 -2.04 1091 2586
Uganda 88 -0.3 1652 1868
Zambia 58 -1.29 543 929
Zimbabwe 34 -2.54 650 1906
Catch-Up Index NZ/Country PPP PCY
Note: The base year for all countries in this Table is 1971 (and the number of years is 42).
Appendix Table 1NZ
a. South Asia
b. Sub Saharan Africa
Country Y-Convergence
Ind. 2013 Gr. Rate w. US Years 1992 2013
Bangladesh 144 1.67 198 2652 1843
Bhutan 183 2.78 96 1410 769
India 262 4.48 75 2709 1035
Nepal 141 1.57 227 3464 2458
Pakistan 127 1.09 247 1458 1147
Sri Lanka 212 3.47 71 1144 539
Angola 235 3.96 71 1547 660
Benin 108 0.35 975 3032 2801
Botswana 165 2.30 77 577 351
Burkina Faso 113 0.56 660 3918 3461
Burundi 70 -1.61 4826 6942
Cameroon 87 -0.63 1723 1976
Central African Republic 51 -3.01 3771 7339
Chad 99.6 -0.02 2637 2647
Congo 200 3.20 97 2116 1057
Côte d'Ivoire 100.1 0.00 61396 1627 1625
Dem. Rep. of Congo 71 -1.54 3389 4799
Ethiopia 126 1.06 376 5208 4135
Gabon 123 0.95 154 425 344
Gambia 66 -1.87 2188 3316
Ghana 136 1.41 210 1888 1391
Guinea 48 -3.28 1842 3856
Guinea-Bissau 69 -1.67 2855 4132
Kenya 96 -0.19 1815 1899
Lesotho 137 1.44 238 2993 2188
Liberia 175 2.58 186 11243 6431
Madagascar 90 -0.48 3978 4439
Malawi 71 -1.54 3835 5372
Mali 127 1.09 353 4610 3626
Mauritania 108 0.35 827 1803 1668
Mauritius 118 0.76 168 355 300
Mozambique 161 2.19 201 7825 4853
Namibia 160 2.16 98 807 504
Niger 76 -1.24 4656 6092
Nigeria 665 8.99 48 6232 937
Rwanda 108 0.35 1030 3675 3407
Senegal 83 -0.84 1960 2370
Sierra Leone 69 -1.67 2258 3251
South Africa 108 0.35 436 460 425
Sudan 166 2.33 137 2374 1432
Swaziland 95 -0.23 593 627
Tanzania 153 1.95 187 3715 2420
Togo 78 -1.12 3084 3945
Uganda 161 2.19 177 4600 2853
Zambia 217 3.58 97 3079 1418
Zimbabwe 28 -5.62 823 2908
Catch-Up Index US/Country PPP PCY
a. South Asia
Note: The base year for all countries in this Table is 1992 (and the number of years is 21).
b. Sub Saharan Africa
Results Behind Figure 2 - Appendix Table 2US
Country Y-Convergence
Ind. 2013 Gr. Rate w. NZ Years 1992 2013
Bangladesh 125 1.02 268 1514 1207
Bhutan 160 2.16 98 805 504
India 228 3.82 73 1547 678
Nepal 123 0.95 317 1979 1610
Pakistan 111 0.48 447 832 751
Sri Lanka 185 2.84 67 654 353
Angola 204 3.29 67 883 432
Benin 94 -0.28 1731 1835
Botswana 143 1.64 73 330 230
Burkina Faso 99 -0.05 2237 2267
Burundi 61 -2.22 2752 4548
Cameroon 76 -1.24 983 1294
Central African Republic 45 -3.56 2152 4785
Chad 87 -0.63 1505 1734
Congo 175 2.58 98 1208 691
Côte d'Ivoire 87 -0.63 928 1065
Dem. Rep. of Congo 61 -2.22 1930 3152
Ethiopia 110 0.43 783 2973 2709
Gabon 108 0.35 254 243 225
Gambia 58 -2.45 1249 2171
Ghana 118 0.76 316 1078 910
Guinea 42 -3.87 1051 2526
Guinea-Bissau 60 -2.30 1630 2705
Kenya 83 -0.84 1036 1243
Lesotho 119 0.79 359 1710 1433
Liberia 152 1.92 218 6397 4213
Madagascar 78 -1.12 2271 2907
Malawi 62 -2.15 2190 3514
Mali 111 0.48 690 2636 2374
Mauritania 94 -0.28 1030 1093
Mauritius 103 0.13 523 202 196
Mozambique 140 1.54 248 4467 3181
Namibia 140 1.54 100 461 330
Niger 67 -1.80 2657 3989
Nigeria 579 8.31 45 3552 613
Rwanda 94 -0.28 2098 2232
Senegal 72 -1.48 1119 1553
Sierra Leone 61 -2.22 1290 2129
South Africa 94 -0.28 263 278
Sudan 144 1.67 157 1355 939
Swaziland 83 -0.84 339 411
Tanzania 134 1.34 230 2119 1585
Togo 68 -1.74 1757 2586
Uganda 141 1.57 209 2626 1868
Zambia 189 2.94 99 1756 929
Zimbabwe 25 -6.11 470 1906
Catch-Up Index NZ/Country PPP PCY
Note: The base year for all countries in this Table is 1992 (and the number of years is 21).
Appendix Table 2NZ
a. South Asia
b. Sub Saharan Africa
